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Abstract. In this paper, I argue that a commitment to science and the methodo-
logical commitment to causal closure do not require a rejection of the idea that 
the choices of souls explain the occurrence of certain events in the physical 
world. Stated slightly differently, I  maintain that one can both affirm science 
and believe that souls causally interfere in the course of events in the physical 
world. Such an affirmation and belief are compatible. In short, science vis-à-vis 
the methodological principle of causal closure poses no problem for souls as 
explanatory agents.
I.
The majority opinion among analytic philosophers is that there is no 
explanatory room in the physical world for a  soul (assuming that it 
exists) that chooses for purposes. This is because of the methodological 
principle of the causal closure of the physical world and the role this 
principle occupies in science. Given that science requires a commitment 
to the causal closure of the physical world, it also requires a commitment 
to the exclusion of souls as explanatorily relevant. In short, if souls exist, 
they cannot and do not do any explanatory work.
In this paper, I argue that a commitment to science and the methodo-
logical commitment to causal closure do not require a rejection of the 
idea that the choices of souls explain the occurrence of certain events 
in the physical world. Stated slightly differently, I maintain that one can 
both affirm science and believe that souls butt into the course of events 
in the physical world. Such an affirmation and belief are compatible. In 
short, science vis-à-vis the methodological principle of causal closure 
poses no problem for souls as explanatory agents.
142 STeWArT GoeTZ
II.
The experimental cognitive scientist Jesse bering has recently argued 
that human beings are believers in soul- or mind-body substance 
dualism.1 As bering sees things, Darwinian natural selection produced 
a cognitive system that gave rise to this dualistic folk psychology about 
souls. Similarly, the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, in his book Soul 
Dust, recognizes the human inclination to believe in substance dualism.2 
Toward the end of his book, Humphrey points out that other scholars 
also acknowledge this ordinary belief in substance dualism:
Thus, developmental psychologist Paul bloom aptly describes human 
beings as ‘natural-born dualists’. Anthropologist Alfred Gell writes: ‘It 
seems that ordinary human beings are “natural dualists”, inclined more 
or less from day one, to believe in some kind of “ghost in the machine”’ ... 
Neuropsychologist Paul broks writes: ‘The separateness of body and 
mind is a primordial intuition.  ... Human beings are natural born soul 
makers, adept at extracting unobservable minds from the behaviour of 
observable bodies, including their own.’3
Though bering, Humphrey, bloom, Gell, and broks maintain that 
human beings naturally believe in substance dualism, all of these authors 
also insist that this belief in substance dualism is false and rests on an 
illusion. Among academics, the denial of substance dualism is standard 
fare. What is also standard fare is adherence to a  metaphysical thesis 
known as ‘naturalism’, which for my purposes I  will assume is the 
position that the final and complete account of all that happens in the 
physical world must and will exclude (eliminate) irreducible purposeful/
teleological explanation. Thus, naturalists affirm that if there is any viable 
form of mental-to-physical explanation (that is, a mental explanation of 
a physical event), it will be causal, and no more than causal, in nature. 
Given their naturalism, these naturalists affirm the ontological principle 
of the causal closure of the physical world, which for the purposes of 
this paper I will understand as the thesis that every physical event that 
is an effect has a complete physical event-cause, where a physical event-
cause is a  complete explanation of a physical effect event in the sense 
1Jesse bering, ‘The Folk Psychology of Souls’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
29 (2006): 453-498.
2 Nicholas Humphrey, Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness (Princeton: Princeton 
university Press, 2011).
3 Ibid., p. 195.
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that, given the former and the relevant laws of nature, there is nothing 
left to be explained about the occurrence of the latter. A commitment to 
ontological causal closure gives rise to a problem of mental-to-physical 
causation, the solution to which (if we exclude eliminativism and 
epiphenomenalism as viable options) seems to require that whatever is 
mental in nature be identical with what is physical in nature.
Now, if one has any robust soul-body convictions, where mental 
events are events in souls, then one will not find this naturalist ‘solution’ 
to the problem of mental-to-physical causation very attractive. moreover, 
if one has any robust convictions about the freedom of the will that 
are libertarian in nature (I  will understand libertarian free will as the 
freedom to make uncaused choices for purposes), one will have further 
reason to be sceptical about the naturalist’s solution to the problem of 
mental-to-physical causation.4 This is because if one believes that a choice 
is uncaused (here I set aside consideration of agent causation, though the 
prospects for libertarian free will are not any better with agent causation, 
given naturalism’s commitment to causal closure and the view that every 
physical effect event has a complete explanation in the form of a physical 
event-cause), then identifying a choice with a physical event that itself 
has a complete physical cause entails the end of one’s libertarianism.
Finally, if one believes in the reality of irreducible purposeful 
explanation (that which is not reducible to causal explanation), one will 
have yet another reason not to accept the naturalist’s resolution of the 
problem of mental-to-physical causation. And if a purposeful explanation 
of a mental event leaves nothing to be explained about the occurrence 
of that mental event (in this sense, it is a complete explanation of this 
event), so that any other explanation of that event would be superfluous, 
then it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is no causal explanation 
of that event. but if there is no causal explanation of that mental event, 
then it cannot be identical with a physical event that has a physical event-
causal explanation. Therefore, the naturalist’s solution to the problem of 
mental-to-physical causation will prove unacceptable to the person who 
believes in irreducible and ineliminable purposeful explanations.
The ontological principle of causal closure has occupied a prominent 
place in various naturalists’ attempts to defend naturalism. However, as 
e. J. lowe points out, it is not easy to state a  form of the ontological 
4 e. J. lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 2008), pp. 67-68.
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causal closure principle that is not basically a  dogma that begs the 
question against someone who believes in irreducible and ineliminable 
mental-to-physical causation.5 regardless of whether or not it is such 
a dogma, I’m going to set it aside and turn to a sister principle of causal 
closure that is methodological in nature and equally, if not more, 
popular with naturalists. What naturalists have in mind with this 
methodological principle of the causal closure of the physical world is 
something like the following: if there is anything about which we can 
be confident in the modern world, it is that science is the final court of 
appeal in all matters philosophical. Thus, anything that conflicts with the 
deliverances of science (e.g., substance dualism and libertarian free will) 
is unacceptable. but science has developed its authority by making use 
of certain assumptions, one of which is the methodological principle of 
causal closure. A comment by the naturalist Humphrey, whom I quoted 
earlier as recognizing the human inclination to believe substance 
dualism, helps to illustrate this point. He asserts that when it comes to 
explaining human behaviour, the scientific study of the brain will reveal 
all that there is to know. And his reason for saying this? ‘my reason is 
simply the guiding principle, which underlies all science, that nothing 
interesting occurs without a material cause.’6 I’ll understand Humphrey’s 
claim as a way of saying that science has a methodological commitment 
to exclude any mental explanation, involving a substantial soul or mind, 
of the occurrence of a physical event. Jaegwon Kim captures this point 
about methodological causal closure with the following example:
You want to raise your arm, and your arm goes up. Presumably, nerve 
impulses reaching appropriate muscles in your arm made those muscles 
contract, and that’s how the arm went up. And these nerve signals 
presumably originated in the activation of certain neurons in your 
brain. What caused those neurons to fire? We now have a quite detailed 
understanding of the process that leads to the firing of a neuron, in terms 
of complex electrochemical processes involving ions in the fluid inside 
and outside a neuron, differences in voltage across cell membranes, and 
so forth. All in all we seem to have a pretty good picture of the processes 
at this microlevel on the basis of the known laws of physics, chemistry, 
and biology. If the immaterial mind is going to cause a neuron to emit 
a signal (or prevent it from doing so), then it must somehow intervene in 
5 Ibid., pp. 42, 63.
6 Humphrey, Soul Dust, p. 17. The emphasis is Humphrey’s.
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these electrochemical processes. but how could that happen? At the very 
interface between the mental and the physical where direct and unmediated 
mind-body interaction takes place, the nonphysical mind must somehow 
influence the state of some molecules, perhaps by electrically charging 
them or nudging them this way or that way. Is this really conceivable? 
Surely the working neuroscientist does not believe that to have a complete 
understanding of these complex processes she needs to include in her 
account the workings of immaterial souls and how they influence the 
molecular processes involved. ... even if the idea of a soul’s influencing the 
motion of a molecule ... were coherent, the postulation of such a causal 
agent would seem neither necessary nor helpful in understanding why 
and how our limbs move. ... most physicalists ... accept the causal closure 
of the physical not only as a fundamental metaphysical doctrine but as an 
indispensable methodological presupposition of the physical sciences. ... 
If the causal closure of the physical domain is to be respected, it seems 
prima facie that mental causation must be ruled out ...7
Kim says that the working neuroscientist does not need to make reference 
to the idea of a  soul causally influencing molecular processes to have 
a  complete understanding of what goes on physically when you raise 
your arm. I will examine this claim of his in a moment. before doing 
so, I  think it is helpful to ask why it is plausible to maintain that the 
causal closure of the physical world is an indispensable methodological 
presupposition of the physical sciences. Alvin Plantinga has asked this 
question in his examination of what he calls methodological naturalism, 
which is, for the purposes of my paper, equivalent to the methodological 
principle of causal closure.8 Plantinga points out that our conception of 
science has been bequeathed to us by the enlightenment, which itself 
sought to teach us to demarcate clearly between faith (which is private 
and subjective) and reason (which is public and objective). Science is 
that which supposedly embodies reason, most especially in the form 
of verifiable and shareable facts that are equally available to anyone, 
whatever a person’s metaphysical convictions. but Plantinga recognizes 
that pointing out the genealogical line of modern science does little to 
help us understand why a scientist must, in order to do science, be bound 
by the methodological principle of the causal closure of the physical 
7 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (boulder, Co: Westview, 1996), pp. 131-132; 
147-148.
8 Alvin Plantinga, ‘methodological Naturalism?’, Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith, 49 (1997), 143-154.
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world. In his effort to find an answer to this question, Plantinga goes on 
to quote the suggestion of the naturalist michael ruse that a scientist’s 
commitment to the methodological principle of the causal closure of the 
physical world is tied to the idea that science deals with what is natural, 
repeatable, and governed by law. but, says Plantinga, ruse’s suggestion 
cannot be right because presumably the big bang is something with 
which science is concerned, yet it is unique and unrepeatable. moreover, 
says Plantinga, the idea of a causal law has its own chequered history, 
with philosophers of science like bas van Fraassen maintaining that 
there are no natural laws. Plantinga points out that there are no doubt 
regularities among events in the physical world, but regularities are not 
necessarily laws, and trying to explain the difference between nomic and 
nonnomic regularities has proven to be messy business.
After some further discussion, Plantinga gets around to considering 
what he calls Duhemian science (named after the roman Catholic 
scientist Pierre Duhem), which is the idea that science should not be 
dependent upon metaphysical commitments. because metaphysical 
commitments are plentiful in number and tenaciously held, Duhem 
believes that if science were dependent upon them, disagreements would 
run riot. Duhem’s point, according to Plantinga, is that all who embrace 
science need to embrace the methodological principle of causal closure 
so that riots are avoided and science can be a cooperative venture.
Duhemian science, then, seeks to be maximally inclusive, and 
Plantinga seems willing to concede the workability of a Duhemian view 
of science when it comes to the hard sciences like physics, chemistry, 
biology, and neuroscience (he is not so sanguine about the Duhemian 
view for a  human science like psychology, but given an inclusion of 
purposeful explanations in psychology, it is not clear that psychology is 
a science). Plantinga, however, is not done with his investigative work 
about the basis for accepting the methodological principle of the causal 
closure of the physical world, and he raises one last issue that he seems 
to think gets at the heart of the matter. This final issue is the idea of 
something’s being, in his words, a ‘science stopper’. Speaking as a theist, 
Plantinga writes:
one of the things we want to do as [God’s] creatures is to understand the 
world he has made, see (to the extent that we can) how it is made, what its 
structure is, and how it works. ... This is what goes on in natural science. 
The object of this science is nature ... but there will be little advance along 
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this front if, in answer to the question, Why does so and so work the way 
it does? or What is the explanation of so and so? we regularly and often 
reply ‘because God did it that way’ ... Ascribing something to the direct 
action of God tends to cut off further inquiry.9
The point Plantinga is making on behalf of the methodological principle 
of causal closure can plausibly be expanded into something like the 
following: one reason for requiring a commitment to the methodological 
principle of causal closure is the notion of scientific progress. After all, if 
science were at some point to reach a dead end in the attempt to discover 
a  physical cause of a  physical effect and did not in principle assume 
causal closure, then after some time of frustration it would be tempting 
to step outside the physical order and appeal to a non-physical, mental 
explanation (Plantinga thinks of such an explanation in the form of God; 
I, along with Kim, Humphrey, and the others I have quoted, am thinking 
of it in terms of the soul). but that would for all intents and purposes 
undercut any further reason for continuing to search for a physical cause. 
one can only imagine how many fewer scientific discoveries would have 
been made had the methodological principle of the causal closure of the 
physical world been rejected.
III.
Plantinga’s response to the above justification for methodologically 
assuming in principle that the physical world is causally closed is to 
say that the fact that appeals to God are science stoppers means that, 
as a general rule, they will not be helpful. However, it does not mean 
that they are never true.10 but if such appeals are science stoppers and 
also sometimes true, how are we to sort out when it is, and when it is 
not, reasonable to believe that there must be a  stop to science and an 
appeal made to God? And what about the methodological principle of 
the causal closure of the physical world? The answers to these questions 
are by no means easy to come by. but I think we can make some, even 
if it is a little, headway in answering them by initially thinking of what 
is excluded as an explanation of a physical event by the methodological 
principle of causal closure in terms of a human soul, instead of God. This 
is the case, for three reasons.
 9 Ibid., p. 152.
10 Ibid.
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First, as Humphrey writes, ‘long before religion could begin to get 
a  foothold in human culture, human beings must already have been 
living in soul land. ... religion is parasitic on spirituality (and not, as some 
religionists would have it [and here one is tempted to think of Plantinga], 
the other way round.’11 Second, it is not implausible to think of God as 
akin to a divine soul, and if the problem of methodological causal closure 
cannot be met vis-à-vis the human soul, there is good reason it cannot 
be met with respect to God. And third, because Kim has nicely posed the 
problem of methodological causal closure in terms of the soul, we have at 
hand a clear formulation of the problem with which to work.
So, what might be said in response to the argument against 
substance dualism and for naturalism that puts front and centre the 
methodological principle of the causal closure of the physical world? 
Well, there is no need for the advocate of this methodological principle 
to assume that there are no souls. That would unnecessarily invoke 
metaphysics in a way that Duhem believes would poison the scientific 
enterprise. So, let us have the naturalist advocate of the methodological 
principle of causal closure concede, for the sake of argument, at least 
the existence of immaterial minds or souls. What this naturalist 
advocate is intent on maintaining is that even if souls exist, the pursuit 
of science requires the principled assumption that the world is causally 
closed to intervention by them. This is the thrust of Kim’s point. This 
concessionary but equally principled position seems to be advocated 
by the geneticist and evolutionary biologist J. b. S. Haldane. He says: 
‘my practice as a scientist is atheistic. That is to say, when I set up an 
experiment I  assume that no god, angel or devil is going to interfere 
with its course ... I should therefore be intellectually dishonest if I were 
not also atheistic in the affairs of the world.’12 With a little argumentative 
license, it is fair to understand Haldane as claiming not only that his 
practice as a scientist is atheistic insofar as he methodologically assumes 
the physical world is causally closed to divine intervention but also that 
it is more broadly physicalistic insofar as it includes the assumption that 
no human soul is going to interfere with the course of the physical world 
that he is studying. likewise, it is fair to assume that Haldane believes 
he would be intellectually dishonest were he not also a physicalist with 
11 Humphrey, Soul Dust, p. 205.
12 J. b. S. Haldane, Fact and Faith (london: london, Watts & Co., 1934); quoted in l. 
m. Krauss, ‘God and Science Don’t mix’, The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2009.
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regard to the living of his life outside the science lab (what he calls ‘the 
affairs of the world’).
The question I want to consider now is whether it follows from the fact 
that a scientist must methodologically assume the causal closure of the 
physical world with respect to souls when he is doing his science that he 
must also methodologically assume, lest he be intellectually dishonest, the 
causal closure of the physical world with respect to souls when he pursues 
the affairs of everyday life. by the end of this paper, I hope to make clear 
that there is neither intellectual dishonesty nor inconsistency in affirming 
methodological causal closure of the physical world in the science lab 
while denying it outside that context in the affairs of everyday life.
To begin constructing a  response to Haldane, I  need briefly to 
sketch a picture of how we ordinarily view ourselves in daily life and an 
implication of this view for our relationship to our physical bodies as we 
conduct the everyday affairs of life. my sketch begins with the idea that 
people are or have souls and on occasion make undetermined choices 
(from here on, I will assume that choices are essentially undetermined 
events), where this implies that those souls, via their choices, causally 
influence the courses of events in their physical bodies. The making 
of choices on these occasions implies that people at that time have 
reasons for performing incompatible actions. It is because they cannot 
perform both actions that they must make a  choice to do one or the 
other (or neither), and whichever choice they make, they make that 
choice for a reason or purpose, where that reason provides an ultimate 
and irreducible teleological explanation of that choice. The making of 
a choice is a mental event that occurs in a soul and either it, or some 
other mental event associated with it (e.g., an intention to act) must 
directly causally produce an effect event in that soul’s physical body. So 
our view of ourselves as engaging in the affairs of ordinary life implies 
that there is mental-to-physical causation and its occurrence is ultimately 
and irreducibly explained teleologically by the reason that explains the 
making of a choice.
To put some flesh on the proverbial bones, consider the movements 
of my fingers right now on the keys of my keyboard as I work on this 
paper. If these movements occur because of a  choice of mine to type, 
then these physical movements are ultimately and irreducibly explained 
teleologically in terms of the purpose for making my choice to write this 
paper, which, we can suppose, is that I make clear that there is no good 
objection from the methodological assumption of the causal closure 
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of the physical world to the view that human beings are soul-body 
compounds and that those souls make choices that causally produce 
(directly or indirectly) effect events in their physical bodies. Hence, if 
the movements of my fingers are ultimately occurring because I made 
a choice to write this essay for a purpose, then a mental event involving 
me (a soul) must be causing those movements to occur as I write this 
essay for the just-stated purpose. In other words, if our commonsense 
view of a human being is correct, I, as a soul, cause events to occur in 
the physical world by making a choice to write this essay for a purpose.
Two intermediate points are appropriate here. First, from the example 
of my typing, it is important to make clear that the claim that there is 
causal interaction between a soul and its physical body is not a ‘God-of-
the-gaps’ type of argument. In discussions about God’s existence, critics 
often argue that theists postulate God’s existence in light of an inability 
of science to provide a complete explanation for a physical datum (or 
data). This lack of a complete explanation is a gap in the scientific story. 
by analogy, a critic might argue that I am postulating my soul’s existence 
in light of an inability of science to provide a complete explanation for 
the movements of my fingers when I type this essay. but this argument 
would be mistaken. my claim is not that there are certain physical events 
(the movements of my fingers) for which a  failure to find a  complete 
physical causal story warrants appeal to the causal activity of a soul as 
their ultimate explanation. rather, the claim is that our commonsense 
understanding of our purposeful activity entails that some physical 
events must occur whose ultimate causal explanation is not other 
physical events but non-physical mental events whose occurrences are 
explained teleologically by purposes.
Second, the choice made for a  purpose that directly or indirectly 
causally produces a physical effect event is, in Plantinga’s terms, a science 
stopper. on an occasion when such a choice is made, there will have to 
be an initial physical event for which there is no sufficient physical cause. 
And we know that this must be the case, given that we make choices 
for purposes. And when I say that ‘we’ know this must be the case, I am 
assuming that scientists, too, know this. What then about the matter of 
intellectual dishonesty and inconsistency on the part of a scientist. What 
can be said in response to Haldane?
Consider once again Kim’s neuroscientist, and let us distinguish 
between a neuroscientist as an ordinary human being and a neuroscientist 
as a  physical scientist. Surely a  neuroscientist as an ordinary human 
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being who is trying to understand how and why my fingers move while 
I  am typing must and would refer to me and my reasons (purposes) 
for acting in a  complete account of why my fingers move. must she, 
however, as a  physical scientist, avoid making such a  reference? Kim 
claims that she must avoid such a  reference because as a  physical 
scientist she must make a methodological assumption about the causal 
closure of the physical world. Is Kim right about this and, if he is, is 
such a  commitment compatible with a  commitment on the part of 
a physical scientist as an ordinary human being to the causal openness 
of the physical world? or must a  neuroscientist, who as a  physical 
scientist assumes methodological causal closure, also assume, if she 
is not to be dishonest and/or inconsistent, that as an ordinary human 
being her mention of purposeful explanations of choices is, say, nothing 
more than an explanatory heuristic device that is necessary because of 
an epistemic gap in her knowledge concerning the physical causes of 
human behaviour?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider what it 
is about physical entities that a physical scientist such as a neuroscientist 
is often trying to discover in her experimental work. What is, dare 
we ask, the purpose of a  neuroscientist’s inquiry? In the case of Kim’s 
neuroscientist, it is eminently plausible to think, as one of Plantinga’s 
earlier comments suggests, that what she is trying to discover as 
a physical scientist is how the physical world works, and this involves 
learning about the capacities of particles or micro-physical entities such 
as neurons and how they are causally affected by exercised causal powers 
of other physical entities, including other neurons.
Here, it is helpful to consider the pioneering work on the brain of 
Wilder Penfield, as he describes it in his book The Mystery of the Mind.13 
Penfield recounts how he produced movements in the limbs of patients 
by stimulating the cortical motor areas of their brains with an electrode. 
As Penfield observed the neural impulses that resulted from stimulation 
by the electrode, he did what Haldane advocates and methodologically 
assumed during his experiments that the areas of the brains of his patients 
on whom he was doing his scientific work were causally closed to other 
causal influences. Without this methodological assumption of causal 
closure, he could not conclude both that it was the electrode, as opposed, 
13 Wilder Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind (Princeton: Princeton university Press), 
1975.
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say, to something ‘behind the scene’ such as an empirically undetectable 
human soul, that causally affected the capacities of the neurons to conduct 
electrical impulses, and that it was the causal impulses of those neurons 
that causally affected the same capacities of other neurons further down 
the causal chains to produce the movements of the limbs. There is no 
reason, however, to think, contrary to what Haldane maintains, that 
because Penfield’s investigation of the brain required the methodological 
assumption of causal closure of the areas of the brains he was studying 
during his experiments that he also had to be committed as a physical 
scientist to the assumption that the physical world is universally (in every 
context) causally closed, where universal causal closure entails that the 
relevant brain (neural) events can only be causally produced by events 
of other physical entities and not instead by mental events of immaterial 
souls alone when they indeterministically choose and intend (plan) 
to act for purposes. That is, there is no reason to think that because 
a neuroscientist like Penfield must assume causal closure of a delimited 
area of the brain in the context of his experimental work in order to 
discover how physical entities causally interact with each other that 
he must also be committed as a  scientist to the universal explanatory 
exclusion of mental events of souls that on certain occasions cause the 
occurrence of events in the physical world. All that the neuroscientist 
as a  physical scientist must assume is that during his experiments 
souls (either the patients themselves or others) are not directly causally 
producing the relevant events in the micro-physical entities in the areas 
of the brain that he is studying. If the neuroscientist makes the universal 
assumption that in any context events in micro-physical entities can only 
have other physical events as causes and can never be causally explained 
by mental events of souls and their purposes, then he does so not as 
a scientist but as a naturalist, where, as I indicated at the outset of this 
paper, a naturalist is a person who believes that the occurrence of physical 
events can only be explained in terms of the occurrence of other physical 
events and without any reference to ultimate and irreducible purposes.
It is relevant to note in this context that Penfield himself was not 
a naturalist. rather, he was a soul-body dualist.14 one can surmise, then, 
that were Penfield to have been presented by Kim or Haldane with the 
methodological argument from causal closure, he would have found it 
wanting. And for good reason. In seeking to understand how events 
14 Ibid., pp. 76, 80.
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of different physical entities affect the capacities of micro-entities such 
as neurons, a neuroscientist such as Penfield is seeking to learn about 
properties of physical entities that are essentially conditional or iffy in 
nature. A  property that is conditional in nature is a  property that is 
specified in terms such as ‘If such-and-such is done to object o (e.g., 
a cause C is exerted on o), then so-and-so will occur to o (e.g., o will 
move at rate r)’. As the Nobel physicist richard Feynman says, scientific 
questions are ‘questions that you can put this way: “if I  do this, what 
will happen?”  ... And so the question “If I do it what will happen?” is 
a  typically scientific question’.15 The following description by David 
Chalmers of the basic particles that are studied by physicists nicely 
captures their iffy nature:
basic particles  ... are largely characterized in terms of their propensity 
to interact with other particles. Their mass and charge is specified, 
to be sure, but all that a  specification of mass ultimately comes to is 
a propensity to be accelerated in certain ways [moved at certain rates] 
by forces, and so on. ... reference to the proton is fixed as the thing that 
causes interactions of a certain kind that combines in certain ways with 
other entities, and so on ...16
What Chalmers describes as a ‘propensity’ of a particle to be accelerated 
is a  capacity of it to be moved which is such that if it is actualized 
(triggered) by an exercised causal power of another entity (whether 
physical or non-physical in nature), the particle will be necessitated to 
behave in a certain way. There is nothing, however, in the nature of the 
propensity or capacity of that particle that entails that it can only be 
actualized by the exercised power of a physical entity. That is, there is 
nothing in the nature of that propensity or capacity that entails that it 
cannot be actualized by souls making undetermined choices for reasons. 
(If there were something about the ontological nature of a  capacity 
of a physical object that it could only be actualized by physical causal 
events, then Haldane would not need to assume that no god, angel or 
devil is going to interfere with the course of his experiment. Such an 
assumption would be superfluous.) Hence, the actualization of a micro-
particle’s capacity to behave in a certain way by a person on an occasion 
15 richard Feynman, The Meaning of It All (reading, mA: Perseus books, 1998), 
pp. 16, 45.
16 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New 
York: oxford university Press, 1996), p. 153.
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when the latter makes a choice for a reason is not excluded by anything 
that is discovered in a scientific study of that capacity. And it is precisely 
on occasions like those noted by Kim, when finger and arm movements 
occur seemingly for purposes, that a  neuroscientist will reasonably 
believe that the originative micro-physical movements are produced 
by the causal activity of a soul that is choosing to act for a purpose. If 
a neuroscientist makes the presupposition that micro-physical entities 
can have their capacities actualized only by other physical entities 
and never by choices made by souls for purposes, then he does so as 
a naturalist and not as a scientist.
my response to the causal closure argument assumes Feynman’s and 
Chalmers’ iffy picture of micro-entities that, in addition to being iffy, is 
also deterministic in the sense that no effect will occur in any micro-
entity unless some causal event determines or necessitates that effect to 
take place. might there not, however, be random (non-deterministic) 
changes in the system of micro-entities as well as the deterministic 
ones? In other words, while sometimes a  neuron fires because it gets 
deterministic causal input from the neurons with which it is connected, 
at other times it fires at random (without any deterministic cause), 
perhaps as a result of random quantum fluctuations in a chaotic system 
that are magnified at the neuronal level.
If we assume for the sake of discussion that neurons do sometimes 
fire randomly, is it possible to distinguish sharply between those firings 
that occur randomly and those that occur as the result of being causally 
determined by a mental event of a soul? After all, the two kinds of firings 
are alike to the extent that neither has a physically deterministic cause. 
I believe that it is possible to make this sharp distinction between the 
two kinds of firings. The way to make the distinction is in terms of 
contexts that are known, in the case of ourselves, through first-person 
experience and, in the case of others, through third-person observation. 
All one need do is ask how plausible it is to maintain that every time 
a person purposefully chooses to do something such as move his fingers 
to type, an initial neuron just happens to fire at random (as a result of 
quantum fluctuations, etc.) with the result that finger movements occur 
that perfectly mesh with or map onto those that are intended by that 
person. because such repeated coincidences would literally be, dare 
I say, miraculous, the only plausible view is that the neuron must not be 
firing randomly but because of the causal input from a soul choosing to 
act for a purpose.
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IV.
I conclude that a commitment to science and a belief in the soul’s explana- 
tory relevance on occasion to the course of events in the physical world 
are compatible. At least, the methodological principle of the causal 
closure of the physical world poses no problem for such a commitment 
and belief. And this is good news for those who think that a belief in the 
existence of the soul and its purposeful activity is not illusory.17
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